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This paper shows that a large fraction of the variability of emerging market bond spreads is explained 
by the evolution of global factors such as risk appetite (as reflected in the spread of high yield 
corporate bonds in developed markets), global liquidity (measured by the international interest rates) 
and contagion (from systemic events like the Russian default). This link has remained relatively stable 
over the history of the emerging market class, is robust to the inclusion of country-specific factors, and 
helps provide accurate long-run predictions. Overall, the results highlight the critical role played by 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Global (exogenous) factors are increasingly seen as key determinants of the borrowing costs of 
emerging economies, for good reasons. In principle, the pricing of debt issued by financially integrated 
emerging economies should be no different from the pricing of non-investment grade securities in 
general, and low-grade bonds in developed economies in particular. Both should reflect the level of risk 
of the security, and a risk premium (the price of risk) that is, in turn, a reflection of the risk aversion –
or, alternatively, risk appetite– of the international investor. It follows that variation in emerging 
market spreads may be driven by exogenous changes in global risk appetite.
2  In addition, glo bal 
liquidity influences the international cost of capital and, to the extent that this cost affects debt 
sustainability, also emerging market spreads. It follows that an important part of the variability of 
emerging spreads could be seen as a reflection of exogenous factors (such as the international business 
cycle) that simultaneously determine both risk appetite and the interest rate. 
 
This paper examines this premise empirically. Specifically, it studies the extent to which changes 
interest rates and bond spreads in developed countries explain the variability of emerging market 
spreads in recent years. More precisely, based on high frequency (daily, weekly and monthly) data, it 
estimates panel error-correction models of emerging spreads on high-yield spreads and international 
rates, controlling for country specific variability (using credit ratings as a proxy for country-specific risk 
or, alternatively, country-month dummies) as well as for the presence of contagion.
3  
 
The main empirical findings are the following: 
i.  Risk appetite, proxied by high-yield spreads in developed markets, is a key determinant of the 
(long- and short-run) evolution of emerging market spread. While the link exhibits a break by 
late 1999, it is nonetheless surprisingly strong over the whole life of the emerging market class. 
ii.  International liquidity (proxied by the US Treasury notes, 10 year constant maturity yield) 
exhibits a significant benign influence on the long-run levels of emerging spreads. 
                                                 
2 Indeed, this intuition has already been noted in the literature. See, e.g., Grandes (2003), Herrera and Perry (2002), Calvo 
and Talvi (2004) and, particularly, García Herrero and Ortiz (2004). 
3 By contagion we understand cases in which a crisis elsewhere negatively affects an economy with neither real ties with the 
crisis country nor a visible deterioration in fundamentals (Mexico 1994 and Russia 1998 are the two episodes for which we 
control in the tests).   3
iii.  These two exogenous factors explain around 30 percent of the long-run (dynamic) variability of 
emerging market spreads (between 15 and 23 percent for the short-run using weekly and 
monthly data, respectively). 
iv.  Contagion from crisis with systemic effects (as exemplified by the 1998 Russian default) exerts 
a strong negative impact on spreads. 
v.  The results are relatively stable over the period under analysis (1994-2005, corresponding to the 
existence of the emerging market debt class), although the link strengthens slightly after 1999.  
vi.  Each of these results is robust to the introduction of additional variables, including country-
month controls to proxy available information about macro fundamentals, and credit ratings. 
 
These findings have several potentially important implications for the emerging markets literature. 
First, they show that variations in emerging market spreads can be largely explained by exogenous 
factors. In this way, the paper contributes to the discussion about the nature of emerging market 
stability, specifically on the degree of exogeneity in the determination of the highly volatile borrowing 
costs faced by emerging economies –a major source of financial distress in the recent past. Moreover, 
it shifts the discussion on debt dynamics from sustainability to vulnerability, as it emphasizes the 
exogenous component of external volatility, placing the focus on the factors that would make a 
country more or less resilient to sudden changes in the external context. The exogenous nature of 
borrowing costs highlights the role of country-specific fundamentals as determinants of the exposure 
to external shocks –rather than as the drivers of borrowing costs as proposed by the standard view of 
debt sustainability. In addition, the findings shed new light on the connection between the borrowing 
costs faced by emerging economies and the cycle in the industrial world (as captured by international 
interest rates), a link already noted in the early literature on capital flows.
4 In passing, the paper 
documents that, contrary to conventional wisdom, credit ratings respond to spreads more than they 
influence them, casting doubt on their informational content.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the reduced-form model that underlies the 
empirical specification of our tests, presents the data and describes the empirical methodology. Section 
III reports the main empirical findings and robustness tests. Section IV concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
4 See, i.a., Calvo et al (1993), and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000).   4
II.  Emerging market and corporate bond pricing 
 
A reduced-form model 
 
Interest rate arbitrage by risk-averse investors implies that  
 
(1) (1  –  q)(1 + r) + qV = (1 + rf) + ϕq ,  
 
where q is the probability of default, V the recovery value after default, r and rf the interest rates 
charged to the bond and to a risk-free asset of similar duration, and ϕ is a parameter that reflects 
investors’ risk aversion. Then, we can express the emerging market spread as: 
 
(2)  spread ≡ r – rf  = [ϕ + (1 + rf) – V][q/(1 – q)] 
 
or, more generally, assuming that recovery values are stable over time and comparable across bonds, as 
 
(3)  spreadit = ρ(r
f









•  ρ denotes the price of credit risk, which depends on the international risk-free rate r
f
t and risk 
aversion ϕt ; 
•  θ measures the incidence of the default risk of the issuer, q, itself a function of country-specific 
(in the case of sovereign debt) or firm-specific (in the case of corporate bonds) fundamentals 
Xit.; and 
•  φi is a scale factor reflecting global factors that affect corporate and emerging market debt 
differently, such as global liquidity (measured by the international risk-free rate r
f
t
 ) and episodes 
of global financial distress (represented by the dummy dt
c ), which we assume to be such that 
φi(r
f






In particular, we have that   5
 
(4) ln  HYt = ln ρ(r
f
t , ϕt) + ln θ[q(HYt)] + αHY ln r
f
t + βHY dt
c  
 
where HYt is a High Yield spread index (the weighted average spread of high-yield corporate debt 
around the world) and q(HYt) stands for the associated (weighted average) credit risk, from which we 
can obtain a good approximation of the log of the price of risk as 
 
(5) ln  ρ(r
f
t , ϕt) = ln (HYt) –  ln θ[q(HYt)] –  αHY ln r
f
t – βHY dt
c  
 
to characterize emerging market spreads as: 
 
(6) ln  embiit = ln HYt + ln θ[q(embiit)] –  ln θ[q(HYt)] + α ln r
f
t  + βHY dt
c  
 
where α = αembi – αHY, and β = βembi – βHY Moreover, assuming for the moment that, in both cases, 
idiosyncratic credit risk is reasonably captured by the credit rating of the issuer (we relax this 
assumption below), so that ln θ[q(Xit)] ≈ γ ln ratingit , and that ratingHY remains relatively stable over 
time, we obtain the following long-run specification: 
 
(7) ln  embiit =  ln HYt + α ln r
f
t  + βHY dt
c  + γ ln ratingit. 
 
Note that the price of risk captured by the high yield spread is a function both of risk appetite and the 
risk-free rate. On the other hand, international interest rates may also influence the pricing of sovereign 
and corporate risk due to international arbitrage: to the extent that it reflects investment returns in the 
developed world, it is expected to affect negatively the sustainability of emerging market debt and its 
investor base relative to other risky securities.  
 
There are reasons to expect that the adjustment to changes in its main determinants would not be 
immediate (for example, imperfect information or market frictions may introduce costs that require 
that deviations from the long-run level exceeds a minimum –possibly asymmetric– threshold to trigger 
a price adjustment). While we are primarily concerned about the determination of emerging market 
spreads in the long-run, to provide a complete characterization of the impact of global factors we also   6
examine the reaction to short-run deviations, and the speed of convergence to the long-run level, by 
augmenting the previous long-run specification with an error correction equation.  
 
The data  
 
To proxy for the price of risk, we use Credit Swiss First Boston’s High Yield Index (HY), which 
measures the spread over the US treasuries yield curve at the redemption date with the worst yield –an 
alternative measure of high yield spreads prepared by J. P. Morgan yielded almost identical results. 
Emerging market sovereign spreads are measured as the spread over Treasuries of J. P. Morgan’s 
EMBI_Global index (embi) for each of the 33 emerging economies included in the Global portfolio 
(period coverage varies across countries, as reported in Appendix Table A2). The credit rating variable 
(rating) is constructed based on Standard & Poor’s rating for long-term debt in foreign currency. As a 
proxy for international liquidity, we use the 10-year US Treasury rate (10YT), although we also run 
tests using the US$ and the DM/Euro 6-month LIBOR for robustness (sourced from the Federal 
Reserve and the BBA, respectively). Also for robustness, as an alternative measure of the price of risk, 
we test the volatility implicit in US stock options (VIX) compiled by the Chicago Board Options 





The econometric model used in this paper describes a basic long-run relationship between the market 
spreads, the high yield index and the international rate. The first step in analyzing this equilibrium 
relationship is to check the individual statistical properties of the panel data series. This is done using 
different panel data unit roots tests as explained below. If the variables in the specific long run 
equation have unit roots, the second step consists in verifying the existence of a long run equilibrium 
relationship using panel cointegration tests. If there is panel cointegration, then the next step is to 
estimate the parameters of the model. 
 
To analyze the statistical properties of each individual panel data series we performed two types of 
panel unit root tests: Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All these tests are based on variations 
of a standard autoregressive process of order one for panel data. Maddala and Wu use an alternative   7
approach to panel unit root tests based on Fisher's (1932) results. We report, for this test, the 
asymptotic χ
2
2N statistic using augmented Dickey-Fuller individual unit root tests. Choi proposes a 
similar standardized statistic as Maddala and Wu, but with a standard normal asymptotic distribution. 
Table 2 shows the results of these panel unit root tests for all individual variables in the long run 
equilibrium relationships for both the monthly (Panel A) and weekly (Panel B) dataset. 
 
It is clear from the table that all variables individually have a panel unit root using standard statistical 
levels of significance. It follows that, if there exists any meaningful relationship between the market 
spreads and the high yield index, it should be because they are co-integrated. To explore this possibility 
we follow Engle and Granger approach and performed panel unit root tests on the residuals of the co-
integration relationship. Table 2 also shows these results. As it can be seen from the table, both tests 
reject the null of panel unit root. 
 
Since, there is evidence of co-integration, by the Granger Representation Theorem, the variables in the 
long run equilibrium relationship have a panel error correction representation (PECM). This 
representation expresses the model in levels and differences in order to separate out the long-run and 
short-run effects. We use the Engle-Granger methodology (Engle and Granger, 1987) to estimate the 
PECM. This methodology is a two-stage modeling strategy which may be formalized as follows. Stage 
one, estimate the long-run parameters of the cointegration equation using a least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) procedure 
 
it it t
f rating W r
t ε α α α α α + + + + + = ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(   ) (HY ln          ) ln(embi (8) 4 3 2 t 1 0i it  
 
where Xt is a vector of  variables that could include some measure of credit rating, the international 
interest rate, etc. The estimators in this first step are consistent even when some or all the variables in 
the right hand side of the equation are endogenous because the estimates of the parameters converge 
to their probability limits at a rate of T instead of at the usual asymptotic rate of T
1/2. From equation 
(8) we get the residuals (ži,t). Stage two uses the error correction term lagged once, ži,t-1, and estimates a 
PECM to get the short-run dynamics. Out of the steady state we do not know the lag structure of the 
short term dynamics, therefore we begin with a general specification of the form 
   8
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We estimate this model using the LSDV approach. We are aware that this is not the most efficient way 
to do it, because the lagged dependent variable appears as explanatory variable in the model, but since 
our sample size is much larger in the time series dimension than in the cross section one we basically 
are assuming that the time dimension is large enough such that the estimation bias goes to zero. 
  
 




At first sight, the data appears to support the view that global factors exert a strong influence on 
emerging market spreads. Figure 1 illustrates the point, presenting the median of individual EMBI 
spreads at each point in time, and the distribution around its cross-section mean (all variables 
normalized by their country-specific means), together with our two main proxies of global factors.
5 A 
simple comparison of the first two panels shows that high yield spreads in developed and developing 
countries (HY and embi) have indeed moved together over the last 10 years –somewhat less so in the 
earlier period due to the strong impact of contagion from the Mexican and Russian crises. Moreover, 
there seems to be also a direct relationship between the emerging markets spreads and international 
liquidity, measured through the US Treasury notes, 10 year constant maturity yield, as showed by a 
statistically significant correlation coefficient of about 0.12. 
 
This first impression is strongly confirmed by more rigorous estimates. Table 3 reports our baseline 
specification and our main results. Column 1 shows the estimated long-run equation of the spread as a 
function the high yield index, the international interest rate, contagion from crises abroad, and the 
credit rating, using monthly data. As can be seen, the correlation is large and highly significant for all 
the variables. In particular, two exogenous global factors HY and 10YT explain about 30% of the 
                                                 
5 The composite EMBI index typically used as a crude measure of emerging market risk pools together individual country 
portfolios of diverse duration and risk, and may be too sensitive to big outliers (highly indebted countries undergoing a 
crisis). Hence, our focus is on the distribution.   9
dynamic (within) variability of spreads, (37% if we add contagion to the list), while the inclusion of 
credit ratings brings this number to close to 60%. The short-run equation is also consistent with our 
priors (column 2). All variables have a strong contemporaneous impact on spreads but no delayed 
effect, and roughly 7% of deviations from the long run level are eliminated per month, so that the 
average lag length is about fourteen months. Weekly data tell the same story (columns 3 and 4): high 
correlation, strong explanatory power (about 60% of dynamic variability), and fast convergence 
(roughly 33 weeks). 
 
Note that the influence of the international interest rate goes beyond the standard arbitrage view that 
indicates that portfolio flows respond to increases in the international rate (Calvo et al., 1993). Indeed, 
the evidence that sovereign spreads adjust close to one to one to changes in the foreign rate implies 
that borrowing costs in emerging economies respond more than proportionally to the interest rate 




Robustness I: Global factors then and now 
 
A natural question regarding the connection between bond pricing in developed and developing 
countries is whether it changed (and, in particular, strengthened) over the years, due to the growing 
familiarity with the emerging market asset and the increasing integration of capital markets (and 
bondholders). In this section we analyze this aspect by looking at possible structural breaks in the long 
run equilibrium relationship. In particular, we study whether the coefficient of HY changes over time.  
 
The specification of the test is standard. Starting from the following long-run equilibrium relationship 
 
it it X ε β α α + + + = ) ln(   ) (HY ln          ) ln(embi (9) t 1 0i it  
 
where Xt is a vector including all variables in our baseline regression. We would like to consider a 
possible break in the α1 coefficient at an unknown date k. Under the null hypothesis of no break, the 
alternative hypothesis implies that: 
                                                 
6 The USD and the DM/Euro LIBOR (both correlated with 10YT) yield comparable results (omitted here for conciseness 
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The Wald test statistic for these hypotheses is defined as 
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We plot W(k) for all possible break dates k. As it is usual in the literature of endogenous breaks, for the 
determination of the possible break dates we truncate the sample to exclude the top and bottom 15% 
of the observations.  The OLS change-point estimation is given by 
 




Figure 2 shows the Wald tests for the long-run equilibrium relationship presented in column (1) of 
Table 3 using monthly data. From the figure we can see that the OLS estimation of the break date is 
September 1999 (marked with a vertical line).
7 Using this break point the long-run equilibrium 
relationship under the alternative hypothesis is: 
 
                                                 
7 Reassuringly, when we compute the same exercises using the weekly dataset we obtain the second week of January 2000 as 
the new cut-off date.   11
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where the numbers in parentheses are the individual coefficients t-statistics. 
 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from these exercises. First, although the explanatory power 
of global factors is higher in the later period (when they explain about 50 percent of the within 
variability), their effect is not circumscribed to the later period. Thus, rather than a recent 
phenomenon, the connection appears to have been relevant since the beginning of emerging market 
debt as an asset class –with only a minor strengthening (as measured by its explanatory power) that 
appears to coincide with the aftermath of the Russian crisis. This latter point is revealed by the 
robustness tests reported in Table 4. There, guided by our previous results, we split the monthly 
sample into two sub-samples (1993-1999, and 2000-2005) and rerun the regressions in columns (1)-(2) 
in Table 3. The results, presented in columns (1) to (4), clearly show that, while the HY coefficients 
(both in the short- and long-run equation) are larger for the earlier period, their explanatory power is 
comparable (and increases for the long-run equation) in the later years. These findings are confirmed 
when we replicate the exercise for the full sample and control the effect on the later period using an 
interaction of HY variables with a period dummy (columns 5 and 6).  
 
Given that emerging economies entered the EMBI portfolio at different points in time, it is natural to 
ask whether the parameter change documented above is simply due to the combination of cross-
country differences and a changing sample composition. To dispel these doubts, we replicate columns 
(1) to (4) for a balanced sample, focusing on three Latin American countries that have been in the 
emerging market class since the very beginning and that have historically represented a large portion of 
the whole emerging market portfolio: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (see columns 7 to 10). The 
messages for this balanced sample are surprisingly consistent with the previous one: a strong impact of 
global factors throughout the sample, with HY exhibiting increasing explanatory power over the years. 
At any rate, while the incidence of global factors is not specific of a particular time, in light of the 
previous results, in what follows we restrict our attention on the later period.   12
 
 
Robustness II: Asymmetries 
 
Conventional wisdom would indicate that, while emerging spreads tend to decline only gradually, they 
go up in a rush. In fact, this asymmetry is readily verified by a cursory look at the distribution of 
monthly changes (Table A3), which in most cases exhibits positive skewness coefficients. 
 
Accordingly, one should observe this fact reflected in the short-run portion of our baseline 
specification, to the extent that the variables included there explain a major share of the variability of 
spreads. Is the elasticity of emerging market spreads to changes in global conditions the same 
irrespective of the sign of the change? Is the effect of a rating upgrade comparable to that of a rating 
downgrade? 
 
The evidence, summarized in Table 5, provides mixed answers. Columns (1) and (3) reproduce the 
long-run estimates for ease of comparison. As can be seen from the short run equation in column (2) 
emerging spreads react more rapidly to increases in risk aversion than to declines. For monthly data, a 
100 percent increase in HY raises the average emerging spread by 105 percent, while a comparable 
decline in HY only reduces the emerging spread by 47 percent. But, using weekly data, column (4), one 
can see that emerging spreads react in the same way to increases or declines in risk aversion. The F 
tests presented in columns (2) and (4)  show that the effect of changes in global liquidity and credit 
ratings does not display a statistically significant asymmetry. Finally, the estimates indicate a faster 
speed of convergence for downward deviations (about four months and a half or ten weeks, using 
monthly and weekly data respectively), again in line with the view that negative shocks (e.g., increases 
in risk appetite or credit downgrades) are reflected in spreads more rapidly than positive ones. This 
evidence suggests that the average lag length of about fourteen months estimated by our baseline 
regression is strongly affected by the upward deviations from the long run equilibrium. 
 
Robustness III: The VIX as an alternative measure of the price of risk 
   13
The economic literature and the financial markets have identified the VIX (a measure of the volatility 
implied in the pricing of options on US stocks) as an indicator of investor risk appetite.
8 While, in our 
view, this index should reflect the (time-varying) systemic volatility in the stock market along with 
variations in risk appetite and, as such, should be an inferior thermometer of the latter, it is nonetheless 
an interesting measure of exogenous global factors and an opportunity to assess the robustness of our 
previous results. Moreover, as Figure 3 illustrates, it is strongly correlated with HY (the coefficient is 
above 50% and highly significant), which lends support to the view that, to certain degree, it may be 
capturing some of the same aspects. 
 
Table 6 provides reassuring results on both fronts. The first two columns report the baseline long- 
and short-run regressions, substituting the VIX for the HY index. The results are broadly comparable 
to those in Table 3, with only a somewhat weaker explanatory power. Indeed, when we include both 
indexes simultaneously, the HY appears part of the influence of VIX on the behavior of spreads for 
the weekly sample (columns (7) and (8)), and most of it for the monthly sample (where the VIX 
coefficient declines visibly and ceases to be significant for the long-run equation, columns (3) and (4)). 
In sum, the VIX appears to be a sensible measure of high frequency changes in risk appetite as 
hypothesized by the literature, although HY reflects market sentiment better over the long run.   
 
 
Robustness IV: Missing fundamentals 
 
In the previous tests, credit ratings were treated mainly as a control for country-specific fundamentals, 
focusing the analysis on the results associated with risk. In so doing, we abstracted from the influence 
of country fundamentals per se, beyond what is captured by the rating assigned to the country. There 
are at least two reasons why one would like to have a closer look at the role of actual fundamentals. 
The first one is the belief that ratings do not always reflect the macroeconomic context. More precisely, 
many observers have pointed out that ratings provide, at best, only a partial account of the actual 
                                                 
8 The VIX, compiled by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) measures the expected stock market volatility over 
the next 30 calendar days, from the prices of the S&P 500 stock index options for a wide range of strike prices. The 
calculation is independent of any model and derives the expected volatility by averaging the weighted prices of out-of-the 
money puts and calls. Historically, in periods of financial stress accompanied by steep market declines, option prices - and 
VIX - tend to rise; the opposite happens when market sentiment improves.  
   14
likelihood of default of individual countries. In fact, there is a growing belief that rating agencies tend 
to lag spreads in their reaction to significant news and, more generally, to reflect credit risk only 
imperfectly –hence the substantial dispersion of spreads within the same rating category. Table 7 
illustrates the point: 12 months before recent default episodes, sovereign ratings assigned by the main 
rating agencies failed in many cases to sound the alarm. At any rate, to the extent that ratings are only a 
partial proxy for country-specific factors, it is essential for our purposes to test whether the incidence 
of global factors reported above is robust to a more parsimonious specification. 
 
A second, related motivation is to evaluate the influence of ratings beyond and above the evolution of 
country-specific fundamentals. While their information content has been questioned on various 
grounds, the results reported above indicate that they exhibit a significant explanatory power for both 
the long-run level and the short-run variation of emerging spreads. Is this result indicating that they 
adequately capture relevant country information, or that they exert an influence of its own, not 
necessarily related to the evolution of the country’s economy? In other words, could ratings be 
considered as an additional exogenous factor that influences the borrowing cost of emerging 
economies, independently of whether or not they reveal valuable information?
 9 
 
These considerations presume that actual fundamentals may influence both the level of spreads and the 
way they comove with risk appetite beyond what is summarized by the credit rating. To verify this 
view, we add to our long-run specification dummies per country-year and country-month to capture 
the influence of fundamentals identified in the literature as determinants of sovereign risk, such as the 
country’s leverage ratio, the degree of (financial and institutional) development, or cyclical output 
fluctuations, which are typically sampled at those frequencies.  
 
Table 8 reports the results. The coefficients and explanatory power of the original baseline equation 
variables remain notably stable using monthly, weekly and even daily datasets, indicating that their 
influence is largely independent of country’s fundamentals, although the power of the international rate 
is weakened by the inclusion of monthly dummies. While this is reassuring for the two exogenous 
                                                 
9 If so, the influence of ratings on bond pricing could be regarded as an additional external source of volatility, bearing the 
question about the extent to which markets react to the relevant country-specific economic data. However, Mora (2004), in 
an updated assessment of this issue, emphasizes that the lagging nature of ratings may actually smooth out the impact of 
deteriorating fundamentals in the run up to a crisis.    15
global factors, it is somewhat intriguing for the case of ratings that, in principle, are conceived as 
summary indicators of the relevant country-specific factors now included.  
 
As noted, this may be due to the fact that, although investors generally recognize the limitations that 
ratings display in practice, the norms that inform their decisions force them to take credit ratings as an 
additional argument –suggesting that, to the extent that they reflect the evolution of the country’s 
economy only partially, they may be regarded as a source of variability that is partially exogenous to the 
policy maker. However, there is another, simpler hypothesis that seems to match the evidence more 
closely: ratings are, in most cases, endogenous to spreads. Figure 4 illustrates this point graphically. 
Mimicking an event-study exercise, the first panel shows the residuals from a regression using the 
specification of column (6) in Table 8 without the ratings variable, averaged over a 40-day window 
centered on the grading event, where the latter coincides with positive and negative changes in the 
rating. As the figure clearly shows, downgrades are preceded by increases in spreads and, apart from a 
mild contemporaneous adjustment (of about 50 bps), exert no substantial impact. The opposite applies 
to downgrades, although in this case the preceding decline in spreads is smaller. 
 
Does this evidence prove that ratings are endogenous to market reaction (in this case, spreads)? Not 
necessarily, since the market may be simply reacting in anticipation of regrading. Moreover, agencies 
themselves typically anticipate regradings by changing their own credit outlook –a reason to use the 
latter to refine the information contained in the rating. However, the second panel of the figure casts 
doubt on this possibility. There, we replicate the event-study exercise, this time defining as event a 
change in the credit outlook given by the rating agency. The logic is straightforward: if the rating does 
more than just validating the perceptions of the market, then changes in outlook (the way agencies 
have to signal the presence of new information that may merit a risk reassessment) should have an 
impact on asset prices. The results, however, are strikingly similar to those in the first panel. This is in 
line with the econometric test in Table 9, where our HY measure is adjusted to reflect changes in the 
credit outlook (the first two columns reproduce the previous results for ease of comparison).
10 Ratings 
                                                 
10 The outlook could be thougth as a five-notch grading scale around the credit rating: positive, positive watch, neutral, 
negative watch, and negative. In the outlook-augmented ratings we give each notch a 0.2 value. Thus, if our rating variable 
takes the value 13 for a BBB bond, a BBB with negative watch outlook would take a value of 12.8 and one with negative 
outlook a value of 12.6 
   16
improve slightly their explanatory power, but the new specification does not introduce any visible 
change in the remaining coefficients.  
 
In sum, the presumption that ratings are a reasonable proxy for fundamental risk is questioned by the 
data. While their inclusion as control may still be justified (since they appear to exert a 
contemporaneous influences on spreads and, at any rate, their exogeneity should not biased the 
estimation of the remaining coefficients), attributing the (strong) link between ratings and spreads to 
the incidence of country-specific factors may be misleading, overstating the role of the latter –and 
understating the influence of global factors.  
 
Robustness V: Risk appetite or corporate risk? 
 
Going back to our reduced-form model, one natural question is to what extent the assumption of 
constant corporate risk influences the results and, more generally, whether the high yield spread is 
capturing changes in perceived risk together with changes in its price. In particular, how did an episode 
such as the Enron scandal, presumably associated with a reassessment of corporate default risk, affect 
the evolution of HY? The answer to these questions has important implications for the interpretation 
of the previous results, which hold only if HY  does not reflect changes in global corporate risk. 
 
A casual look at the evidence help dispel these concerns. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the weighted 
average rating of the corporate bond sample based on which the high yield spread is computed 
(rating(HY)). As can be seen, this rating moves within a very limited range of less than half-notch, 
hardly a significant source of variability. Moreover, increases in HY in the latest period, while 
negatively correlated with the rating (as expected), do not appear to reflect a visible deterioration of the 
risk (as perceived by the rating agencies).
11 On the contrary, the Enron crisis coincides with a 
downward revision of corporate risk, as reflected by the improvement of corporate ratings (as a result, 
the correlation between the two turns positive during the period).  
 
The implication of these findings (namely, that HY captures the price rather than the quantity of risk) 
is confirmed by the regressions in Table 10, where we include the corporate rating measure directly in 
                                                 
11 Nor do they reflect increases in the incidence of U.S. corporate bankruptcies, which actually declined steadily in the 
period under study.   17
the regression. As expected, the new control is not significant and has no effect on the rest of the 
coefficients. The same message is given by the last two columns. There, we replaced the HY index by 
the BBB spread, which should be less sensitive to risk (lower than the one associated with the index) 
and risk changes, and a better gauge of changes in the price of risk. Reassuringly, the new measure 
underperforms the HY index.





One way to gauge how much of the variation in emerging market spread can be explained by the few 
exogenous variables identified in our baseline model consists in simulating the path of individual 
spreads based solely on the long-run specification. We perform this test by calibrating this equation 
using data through end-2001, and simulating the behavior of spreads for the remaining period (January 
2002- November 2005).
13 Specifically, in order to assess the relative predictive power of global factors, 
we re-estimate the long-run specification of Table 8, column (1), and compute the out-of-sample path 
that results from variations in the global variables HY and the international rate, keeping ratings fixed 
at their end-2001 levels. 
 
Figure 6 reports the results.
14 It compares the actual EMBI spread with the predictions from the long-
run equation. Three aspects deserve to be stressed in the figures. First, predictions are generally quite 
good, including for many Latin American countries that underwent severe episodes of capital account 
reversals in the period considered. Second, the predictions highlight the explanatory power of the two 
exogenous variables: despite short-term, transitory swings due to country-specific episodes, spread 
movements closely reflect these three variables, and eventually converge to levels that are largely 
explained by them. Third, although many of these episodes may have coincided with (and possibly 
facilitated by) a deterioration in those global factors, they far exceed the variability of the latter, 
suggesting that some country-specific ingredient was crucially in place at the time. Brazil is a case in 
                                                 
12 The same result is obtained when we proxy the price of risk by the spread on U.S. Baa bonds, which according to some 
authors is the best proxy for risk aversion (Blanchard, 2004). 
13 As a result, some countries that were included in the EMBI after (or shortly before) 2001 are dropped due to lack of 
observations.  
14 Naturally, one could readily obtain much more precise one-period-ahead forecasts by estimating the short run equation 
and adding it to the long-run one, i.e., computing E(ln(embi)t )= E(ln(embilong,-1) + E(∆ln(embi)). Since our interest is in the 
persistent effect of global factors, the results are ommitted here (they are available from the authors on request).   18
point: the financial turmoil of late 2002 associated with the uncertainty surrounding the election and 
the transition to a new government which was clearly independent of the evolution of global factors; 
once over, spreads rapidly converged to their long-run levels.  
 
An even more starkly example of the incidence of long-run factors is provided by Argentina. Figure 7 
shows the evolution of the spread before and after de sovereign default, and the predicted value for the 
post-default period, setting the rating at its levels as of end-2000. As can be seen, the prediction yields a 
spread of about 500 right after the exchange was concluded –very close to the one actually realized. 
Thus, using a model calibrated based on the information available before the crisis, the dramatic 
decline in spreads experienced by the country after the sovereign default was left behind could have 
been predicted simply as a result of the increase in risk appetite and the decline in international interest 
rates that followed. 
 
 
IV.  Final remarks 
 
Our tests attempted to estimate the variability explained by global factors, but adopted an agnostic 
approach to country-specific factors, which pose non-trivial empirical problems. Most available 
country-specific controls are sampled at too low a frequency and, even when they are available on a 
daily basis like credit ratings, are likely to be endogenous. Therefore, an accurate decomposition of 
emerging market spreads volatility into their systemic and idiosyncratic determinants is an uphill and 
still pending task.   
 
This does not detract from the validity of our main result: Global factors, such as global liquidity and 
market sentiment, explain a large part of the (substantial) volatility of emerging market spreads –a 
connection that, while not new, has tended to strengthen over the years. The implications of these 
findings are immediate. On the one hand, no forecast of the borrowing cost (and, as a result, the fiscal 
sustainability) of emerging economies can ignore these exogenous factors (which, in addition, are often 
easier to predict than fundamentals). On the other, besides improving macro fundamentals, emerging 
economies need to take into account their exposure to global factors, and to devise mechanisms to 
reduce it. Financial integration brings contagion not only from other emerging economies but also   19
from the rest of the developed world. In the absence of a concerted effort to reduce their effects, 
newcomers, like infants, had better take their shot well in advance.   20
Table 1. Summary statistics  
 
(monthly sample) 
Variable Frequency  N  mean  median  Std  Dev min  max 
embi Monthly  3309 648.1935 402.7520 831.5839 7.0240 7078 
HY Monthly  191  580.8115 523  203.5349 307  1080 
rating  Monthly  4351 10.8322 11  3.3172 1  18 
10YT  Monthly  191  5.9228  5.86  1.3511 3.37 9.04 
VIX  Monthly 191 19.4612  18.88  6.3882  10.63 44.28 
rating+outlook  Monthly  4283 10.8453 11  3.3537 1  18 
Rating(HY) Monthly  131  4.4352 4.3925 0.1323  4.2347  4.7403
HY(Split BBB)  Monthly  131  250.8441 224.88  103.8955 114.25  563 
 
(weekly sample) 
Variable Frequency  N  mean  median Std  Dev  min  max 
embi Weekly  14370 645.7757 399  832.7009  -6  7222
HY Weekly  493  583.6755 556  211.4735  301  1116
rating Weekly  18919 10.8375  11  3.3125  1  18 
10YT  Weekly 834 5.9284 5.88 1.3443  3.18  9.07 
VIX Weekly  836  19.4045  18.36  6.4250  9.48  45.74
rating+outlook Weekly 18620 10.8489  11  3.3506  1  18 
   21
Table 2. Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Monthly panel  Maddala-Wu  Choi 
 PMW  p-Value ZMW p-Value 
embi 64.354  0.603  0.231 0.591 
HY 55.121  0.904  -0.234 0.407 
10YT 68.536  0.527  -0.111 0.455 
rating 68.710  0.206  1.202 0.885 
        
ECi;t-1 1308.99 0.000  -7.992 0.000 
        
Weekly panel  Maddala-Wu  Choi 
 PMW  p-value ZMW p-value 
embi 59.691  0.754  0.163 0.435 
HY 36.816  0.999  -0.289 0.389 
10YT 51.306  0.955  -0.099 0.480 
rating 47.648  0.876  -2.396 0.992 
        
ECi;t-1 4310.77 0.000  -8.905 0.000 
      
Note: ECi;t-1 are the residuals of the long run equilibrium relationship presented in column 
(1) ((4)) of Table 3 for monthly data (weekly data). All variables are in logs. Lags for the 
panel unit root tests were selected using Schwarz information criterion. 
   22
Table 3. Global factors and emerging market spreads 
 
 Monthly  Weekly 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln(HYt) 0.776    0.773   
 (10.84)***   (9.41)***   
Ln(ratingi;t) -1.527    -1.537   
 (8.13)***    (7.96)***   
Ln(10YTt) 1.094    0.964   
 (8.09)***    (7.07)***   
Contagion Russia  0.610    0.568   
 (8.03)***    (4.36)***   
Contagion Mexico  0.186  0.045     
 (2.20)**  (4.58)***    
ECi;t-1   -0.070    -0.030 
   (5.34)***   (3.25)***
∆Ln(HYt)   1.108    0.834 
   (6.02)***   (6.52)***
∆Ln(ratingi;t)   -0.637    -0.429 
   (3.22)***   (3.76)***
∆Ln(10YTt)   0.272    0.134 
   (1.81)*    (1.27) 
∆Ln(embii;t-1)   -0.160    -0.411 
   (4.69)***   (8.41)***
∆Ln(embii;t-2)       -0.191 
       (5.04)***
Constant 2.546  -0.007  2.774  -0.003 
 (3.22)***  (0.94)  (3.31)*** (1.00) 
Observations 2767  2689  11141  10983 
R-squared (within)  0.5826  0.2853  0.5918  0.3152 
% Variance explained by HYt 17.0428    23.4124   
%Variance explained by HYt & 10YTt 31.3530    32.6942   
%Variance explained by HYt, 10YTt, & Contagion  37.0128    37.8266   
%Variance explained by ∆HYt   21.8848    15.1797 
%Variance explained by ∆HYt & ∆10YTt   22.5379    15.2855 
%Variance explained by ∆HYt, ∆10YTt, & Contagion  22.5667     
Robust t statistics in parentheses, clustered by year 
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Table 5. Robustness: Asymmetries 
 
 Monthly  Weekly 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln(HYt) 0.899    0.884   
 (22.68)***   (33.95)***   
Ln(ratingi;t) -1.268    -1.292   
 (7.00)***    (6.40)***   
Ln(10YTt) 0.761    0.786   
 (7.19)***    (7.32)***   
ECi;t-1(+)   -0.015    -0.010 
   (0.44)    (0.39) 
ECi;t-1(-)   -0.222    -0.102 
   (3.05)***   (2.22)** 
∆Ln(HYt)(+)   1.046    0.651 
   (5.93)***  (14.77)***
∆Ln(HYt)(-)   0.473    0.670 
   (3.10)***   (7.27)*** 
∆Ln(ratingi;t)(+)   -0.544    -0.264 
   (2.25)**    (3.85)*** 
∆Ln(ratingi;t)(-)   -0.367    -0.251 
   (3.70)***   (3.72)*** 
∆Ln(10YTt)(+)   -0.001    0.049 
   (0.01)    (0.26) 
∆Ln(10YTt-1)(+)   -0.080    -0.090 
   (1.03)    (1.34) 
∆Ln(10YTt)(-)   0.101    0.030 
   (0.39)    (0.25) 
∆Ln(10YTt-1)(-)   -0.067    -0.170 
   (0.25)    (2.15)** 
∆Ln(embii;t-1)   -0.158    -0.463 
   (3.12)***  (11.91)***
∆Ln(embii;t-2)       -0.129 
       (6.68)*** 
Constant 1.608  -0.044  1.718  -0.014 
 (4.62)***  (2.41)**  (4.47)*** (2.27)** 
Observations 1877  1837  8174  8065 
R-squared (within)  0.7083  0.2489  0.6947  0.3235 
F-tests        
EC(+) - EC(-)   0.2073**   -0.0922 
∆Ln(HYt)(-)- ∆Ln(HYt)(-)   0.5730**   -0.0189 
∆Ln(ratingi;t)(+) - ∆Ln(ratingi;t)(-)   -0.1774    -0.0137 
∆10YTt(+) + ∆10YTt-1(+) - ∆10YTt(-) - ∆10YTt-1(-)  -0.1152    0.0991 
Robust t statistics in parentheses, clustered by year 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7. Robustness: Sovereign credit ratings 12 months before default 
 
Country  Month of default S&P  Moody's 
Dominican Republic  February 2005  CC  2  B3  6 
Venezuela  January 2005  B-  6  Caa1  5 
Uruguay  May 2003  BB-  9  Ba2  10 
Indonesia  April 2002  B-  6  B3  6 
Argentina  November 2001  BB-  9  B1  8 
Ukraine  January 2000  n/a  n/a B3  6 
Indonesia  April 2000  CCC+ 5  B3  6 
Ecuador  July 2000  n/a  n/a B3  6 
Pakistan  January 1999  B+  8  B2  7 
Russian Federation  January 1999  BB-  9  Ba2  10 
Source: Authors' calculations based on S&P and Moody’s data. 
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Table 10. Robustness: BBB spread  
(monthly) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(HYt)  0.849     
  (25.54)***    
Ln(HY splitBBBt)    0.789  
     (18.49)***  
Ln(Rating(HYt))  -0.577  -1.011  
  (0.72)  (0.59)  
Ln(Ratingi;t)  -1.705  -1.731  
  (8.83)***  (9.10)***  
Ln(10YTt)  0.764  0.891  
 (7.08)***    (10.01)***  
ECi;t-1   -0.137  -0.130 
   (3.56)***  (3.89)*** 
∆Ln(HYt)   0.759    
   (6.11)***    
∆Ln(HY splitBBBt)     0.517 
      (5.92)*** 
∆Ln(Rating(HYt))   2.151    
   (2.81)***    
∆Ln(Ratingi;t)   -0.843  -0.793 
   (5.26)***  (5.79)*** 
∆Ln(10YTt)   0.161  -0.022 
   (0.83)  (0.12) 
∆Ln(Spreadi;t-1)   -0.152  -0.123 
   (2.95)***  (3.26)*** 
Constant  3.799 -0.011 5.321 -0.015 
 (3.20)***  (1.64)  (2.27)** (1.97)** 
Observations  1805 1755 1805 1784 
R-squared  (within) 0.7183 0.2427 0.7019 0.2079 
Robust t statistics in parentheses, clustered by year 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   30
Figure 1. HY index and Embi 
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Figure 2. Robustness I: Structural break 
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Figure 4. Robustness IV, events study: rating and outlook changes. 
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Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
 
Name Description  Source 
embi  JP Morgan EMBI global index blended spread, in bps  Datastream 
HY  CSFB high yield global  index, USD, long term debt, in bps  Bloomberg 
10YT  US Treasury notes, 10 year constant maturity yield, bps  U.S. Treasury 
rating  S&P rating, long term debt, end of period, foreign currency  S&P 
Vix CBOE  Volatility  Index  CBOE 
rating+outlook  S&P rating augmented using the S&P outlook. Long term 
debt, end of period, foreign currency  S&P 
Rating(HY)  Weighted average rating of issues included in JP Morgan high 
yield global index   JP Morgan 
   45
Table A2. Countries and periods covered 
 
Country   Monthly  Weekly 
    obs begins ends  obs begins ends 
Argentina   101 12/31/93 11/30/05 307 7/4/96 11/24/05 
Brazil   132 12/31/94 11/30/05 493 7/4/96 11/24/05 
Bulgaria   85  11/30/98 11/30/05 368 11/26/98 11/24/05 
China   141 3/31/94  11/30/05 493 7/4/96 11/24/05 
Chile   79  5/31/99  11/30/05 341 6/3/99 11/24/05 
Colombia   106 2/28/97  11/30/05 458 3/6/97 11/24/05 
Croatia   89  1/31/97  5/31/04 388 1/23/97  6/24/04 
Dominican Republic    45  11/30/01 11/30/05 189 12/6/01 11/24/05 
Ecuador   64  8/31/00  11/30/05 276 8/31/00 11/24/05 
Egypt   53  7/31/01  11/30/05 228 8/2/01 11/24/05 
El Salvador    44  4/30/02 11/30/05 189 5/2/02 11/24/05 
Hungary   83  1/31/99  11/30/05 358 2/4/99 11/24/05 
Indonesia   19  5/31/04  11/30/05 80 6/3/04 11/24/05 
Korea   124 12/31/93 3/31/04 409 7/4/96  4/29/04 
Lebanon   92  4/30/98  11/30/05 398 4/30/98 11/24/05 
Malaysia   110 10/31/96 11/30/05 476 10/31/96 11/24/05 
Mexico   144 12/31/93 11/30/05 493 7/4/96 11/24/05 
Morocco   93  3/31/98  11/30/05 406 3/5/98 11/24/05 
Pakistan   39  6/30/01  11/30/05 168 7/5/01 11/24/05 
Panama   107 1/31/97  11/30/05 464 1/23/97 11/24/05 
Peru   96  12/31/97 11/30/05 417 12/18/97 11/24/05 
Philippines   96  12/31/97 11/30/05 415 1/1/98 11/24/05 
Poland   126 6/30/95  11/30/05 493 7/4/96 11/24/05 
Russia   73  12/31/97 11/30/05 317 1/1/98 11/24/05 
South Africa    132 12/31/94 11/30/05 493 7/4/96 11/24/05 
Thailand   103 5/31/97  11/30/05 445 6/5/97 11/24/05 
Tunisia   43  5/31/02  11/30/05 184 6/6/02 11/24/05 
Turkey   114 6/30/96  11/30/05 493 7/4/96 11/24/05 
Ukraine   48  12/31/01 11/30/05 207 12/27/01 11/24/05 
Uruguay   54  5/31/01  11/30/05 235 5/31/01 11/24/05 
Venezuela   142 12/31/93 11/30/05 487 7/4/96 11/24/05 
   46
Table A3. Changes in Emerging Market Spreads 
(monthly sample; in percent) 
 
Country name  N  mean  median StdDev min  max  skewness 
Argentina 100  0.0323  -0.0288 -0.0288 -0.9224 1.8330 2.8299 
Brazil 132  0.0081  -0.0285 -0.0285 -0.3038 1.3377 3.3149 
Bulgaria 85  -0.0203 -0.0182 -0.0182 -0.2589 0.3868 0.5952 
China 140  0.0050  -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.3950 1.2595 3.8404 
Chile 78  -0.0058 -0.0156 -0.0156 -0.3064 0.4615 0.9362 
Colombia 105  0.0162  -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.2270 0.9533 2.3593 
Croatia 89  0.0088  -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.3658 0.8098 1.7101 
Dominican Republic  44  0.0121  -0.0228 -0.0228 -0.2251 0.4139 0.5240 
Ecuador 64  -0.0145 -0.0275 -0.0275 -0.5292 0.4101 -0.0632 
Egypt 52  -0.0197 -0.0626 -0.0626 -0.4072 0.5973 1.0675 
El Salvador  43  -0.0009 0.0093 0.0093 -0.1478 0.1859 0.2228 
Hungary 82  0.0875  -0.0191 -0.0191 -0.7516 2.4406 2.2840 
Indonesia 18  -0.0183 -0.0616 -0.0616 -0.1608 0.3370 1.2757 
Korea 123  0.0224  -0.0122 -0.0122 -0.3430 1.7783 3.6450 
Lebanon 91  0.0088  0.0000  0.0000 -0.2466 0.5957  1.0699 
Malaysia 109  0.0141  -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.3654 0.7263 1.2197 
Mexico 143  0.0068  -0.0256 -0.0256 -0.2435 1.0460 2.9420 
Morocco 93  0.0056  -0.0248 -0.0248 -0.4047 2.4837 6.4947 
Pakistan 37  -0.0429 -0.0509 -0.0509 -0.4762 0.3381 0.0169 
Panama 107  0.0040  -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.3516 0.7682 2.1712 
Peru 96  0.0014  -0.0384 -0.0384 -0.1921 0.8272 2.0001 
Philippines 95  0.0066  -0.0096 -0.0096 -0.3008 1.2363 5.1035 
Poland 126  -0.0023 -0.0238 -0.0238 -0.4931 1.2043 2.5033 
Russia 72  0.0220  -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.2868 2.8362 7.0379 
South Africa  131  0.0046  -0.0365 -0.0365 -0.2671 1.1714 3.1456 
Thailand 102  0.0207  -0.0151 -0.0151 -0.5235 1.6069 3.3475 
Tunisia 42  -0.0096 -0.0500 -0.0500 -0.4465 1.0948 2.6051 
Turkey 113  0.0199  -0.0326 -0.0326 -0.2744 2.0647 5.1150 
Ukraine 48  -0.0274 -0.0656 -0.0656 -0.3569 0.3203 0.2740 
Uruguay 53  0.0214  -0.0260 -0.0260 -0.2170 0.7433 1.5831 
Venezuela 141  0.0116  -0.0165 -0.0165 -0.3773 2.0324 5.3668 
 
 
 